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Armed forces in new states
<p class="3text" align="left">NEW nations, even more than old, depend for their<br /> existence on the integrity of their armed forces; the<br /> most intelligent, experienced and well-meaning government<br /> may not survive if the army is corrupt. A nation which has<br /> just become independent of colonial rule is likely to be<br /> faced with a lack of internal cohesion, and in the last<br /> resort the army may be the cement to hold the state<br /> together. Apart from that, the former colonial state has<br /> probably to face a problem of external defence to which<br /> there can hardly be a satisfactory solution. Most British<br /> colonies maintained armed forces which were judged<br /> adequate for internal security and the patrolling of the<br /> frontiers; they were sometimes enough to meet the minor<br /> threat of attack by a neighbouring power of similar status;<br /> they were never adequate to meet the major threat, that is<br /> attack by a major power. For this they relied on support<br /> from the metropolitan power. What should the new<br /> country do about this?</p>
<p class="3text" align="left">Clearly the first need is a force which can be relied on for<br /> internal security. It simply will not do if you cannot move a<br /> battalion to the scene of a riot because the Commanding<br /> Officer is known to belong to the affected tribe or party.<br /> What is needed is an impartiality such that the Govern­<br /> ments orders are obeyed without question, whatever the<br /> party or other loyalties involved. This is not easy to<br /> establish and depends on many factors not strictly military;<br /> there may be historical reasons for admiring or despising<br /> the armed forces; the officers may all come from one<br /> section of society; the whole tradition of public life may be<br /> against impartiality.</p>
<p class="3text" align="left">We British are perhaps unduly liable to take it for granted<br /> that our own institutions, our own methods which have<br /> worked well with us for a long time, not only can be but</p>
<p class="3text" align="left">should be adopted--adapted also, may be, but nevertheless<br /> basically become the prototype and model--for parallel<br /> institutions in other countries, especially new countries<br /> which have emerged into independence out of British<br /> colonial rule. This applies particularly to the armed forces<br /> which, in any such new states, are if anything more im­<br /> portant and more potentially powerful within the states<br /> than they are in established democracies like the United<br /> Kingdom. I personally happen to think that it would be a<br /> very good thing if the armed forces of new states were<br /> organised, trained and politically directed on the British<br /> model. But this short book will have served a valuable<br /> purpose if it brings home to us the practical difficulties in<br /> the way of any such thing--the multitudinous factors which<br /> make the problems of a Cardwell or a Haldane in this<br /> fortunate island totally different from those confronting the<br /> far less experienced statesmen responsible for moulding the<br /> armed forces of emergent nations.</p>
<p class="3text" align="left">It would of course have been very nice had it worked out<br /> as we dreamed and if the armies of all newly independent<br /> African and Asian states could have sprung like hoplites<br /> from seed sown by dedicated British officers, fully armed<br /> with the Public School and Sandhurst traditions of political<br /> impartiality and disciplined loyalty to the Government of<br /> the day, whatever its political colour. As a matter of fact,<br /> as far as our ex-dependent territories are concerned, I do<br /> not think we or they have done too badly in this regard;<br /> and where they have fallen short of the ideal, it may have<br /> been due, at least in part, to lack of foresight or undue<br /> conservatism on our part. I am thinking for instance of our<br /> failure until too recently to bring on indigenous officers in<br /> African local forces.</p>
<p class="3text" align="left">It is, however, worth reflecting that if the relations<br /> between a Government and its armed forces are to be all<br /> that we think they should be, the Government itself must be<br /> impartial, stable, honest and politically mature enough to<br /> deserve a high degree of disciplined loyalty. Latin America</p>
Daftar Isi
Part I. Introduction
Part II. Security Forces in the Sales of Commonwealth Africa
Part III. The U.N. Forces in the Congo
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0226598001 | 355.3-Gut-A | PERPUSTAKAAN SESKOAL (Rak 10 B Baris 3) | Tersedia |
0226598002 | 355.3-Gut-A | PERPUSTAKAAN SESKOAL (Rak 10 B Baris 3) | Tersedia |
No. Panggil | 355.3-Gut-A |
---|---|
Penerbit | London: Oxford University Press., 1962 |
Deskripsi Fisik | - |
Bahasa | Indonesia |
ISBN/ISSN | - |
Tipe Isi | Text |
Tipe Media | - |
Subjek | - |
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