Text
Journal Of Political Economy
In economic models, agents are instructed to echieve the goals of their organizations (corporations, government, etc). While asymetric information and contracting problems may enable agents to pursue their own agenda, incentive schemes are designed so as to align their interests with those of the organization as well as is consistent with the informational and contracting constraints.
1642307001 | 051.320-330-Han-j | PERPUSTAKAAN SESKOAL (Rak 1 B Baris 4) | Tersedia |
No. Panggil | 051.320-330-Han-j |
---|---|
Penerbit | CHICAGO: University Press., 1999 |
Deskripsi Fisik | - |
Bahasa | English |
ISBN/ISSN | - |
Tipe Isi | Text |
Tipe Media | - |
Subjek | - |
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